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Priming Effects on Commitment to Help and on
Real Helping Behavior
Costanza Scafﬁdi Abbate and Stefano Boca
University of Palermo
Giuliana Spadaro and Angelo Romano
University of Torino
Years of research on bystander apathy have demonstrated that the physical presence of
others can reduce the tendency to help individuals needing assistance. Recent research
on the implicit bystander effect has suggested that simply imagining the presence of
others can lead to less helping behavior on a subsequent unrelated task. The present
study was designed to contribute to previous ﬁndings on the implicit bystander effect
by demonstrating these effects on commitment to help and on real helping behavior,
rather than simply on intentions to help. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that merely
priming participants with the construct of being in a group at Time 1 created signiﬁ-
cantly less commitment to future helping on a subsequent task at Time 2. Study 2 aimed
to extend this effect to behavioral measures and veriﬁed that participants exposed to a
group prime helped less than those who were exposed to a single-person prime. The
implications of these ﬁndings for the literature on the bystander effect are discussed.
The classic bystander apathy effect is a stable phenom-
enon commonly observed in lab and ﬁeld experiments.
It consists of the inhibition of helping responses in the
presence of observers (Clark & Word, 1974; Darley &
Latane´, 1968; Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973; Latane´ &
Nida, 1981). Research on bystander intervention has
revealed that the higher the number of people watching
a request for help, the lower the probability that each
nearby individual will actually help. Latane´ and Darley
(1970) identiﬁed three psychological processes that
may account for bystanders’ tendency to inhibit one
another’s responsiveness in emergencies. The ﬁrst is dif-
fusion of responsibility, a process that leads to reducing
psychological costs associated with nonintervention.
When others people are present, such costs are shared
and nonintervention becomes more probable. As the
number of bystanders increases, each individual feels
less responsible to help. The second process is evaluation
apprehension, which reﬂects the notion that people may
have a fear of being judged by other bystanders when
acting in public. Thus, when one feels he is observed,
he fears making a mistake and creating the impression
of inadequacy; this in turn makes him more reluctant
to intervene in a critical situation. Finally, the third pro-
cess refers to the concepts of social inﬂuence (Darley &
Latane´, 1968; Darley et al., 1973) and pluralistic ignor-
ance (Prentice & Miller, 1996), which recognizes that
when an apparent helping situation is ambiguous,
people look to others to interpret it. Thus, if other
people are standing idly and appear quiet, would-be
helpers deduce that the situation may not be an actual
emergency.
A recent theoretical development concerning the
bystander effect moves the level of explanation from
situational variables to cognitive processes (Garcia &
Harrison, 2007). Research has shown that simply
imagining a particular social context can have the same
effect as actually experiencing that context. In fact,
Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002) found
that merely priming the presence of a group can affect
helping behavior on a subsequent task. The authors
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named this phenomenon the implicit bystander effect.
Although classic accounts assumed that would-be
helpers must be present in the helping behavior situation
for bystander apathy to occur, the implicit bystander
effect reveals that a similar decrease in intervening can
be found even when would-be helpers are not built into
the facets of the helping situation. Over a series of ﬁve
studies, Garcia et al. (2002) showed that just imagining
being in a large group led to less helping behavior on a
subsequent task. For example, participants who ima-
gined dining in a restaurant with 10 other people were
subsequently less likely to help the experimenter by par-
ticipating in a second study than those who imagined
dining with just one other person.
The effect of imagining a social context on sub-
sequent attitudes and behavior may be explained in
terms of priming effects. There is considerable evidence
that subtle cues, or primes, in our social environment
activate associated knowledge structures in our minds.
As these knowledge structures become more accessible
in memory, they often have a powerful inﬂuence on
our cognitive processes and behaviors. According to
Garcia et al. (2002), activating a social context has a
similar effect and increases the accessibility of associated
mental representations. Imagining themselves in a
crowd, for example, could activate in people feelings
of being lost in a crowd and unaccountable, feelings
associated with less helping behaviors in real situations.
The authors explained this erosion of responsibility by
referencing classic deindividuation theory (Diener,
1980; Zimbardo, 1969). They proposed that
being in or simply thinking about a group is enough to
activate this construct [the bystander effect] because
part of the concept of being in a group is the notion
of being lost in a crowd, being deindividuated,
and having a lowered sense of personal accountability.
(p. 845)
In the current research, previous implicit bystander
effect ﬁndings were replicated. But unlike Garcia
et al.’s (2002) research, in which the authors assessed,
above all, participants’ behavioral intentions rather than
their actual behavior, here the focus is on commitment to
help (Studies 1a and 1b) and on real helping behavior
(Study 2) as dependent variables.
WHY COMMITMENT?
With few exceptions (e.g., Macrae & Johnston, 1998;
Scafﬁdi Abbate, Ruggieri, & Boca, 2013), in most
research concerning the effect of priming on prosocial
behavior, a generic intention to help is usually assessed
(Garcia et al., 2002; Greitemeyer, 2009; Nelson &
Norton, 2005; Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007;
Rubin, 2011).1 It is well-established in the literature that
intentions lead to behavior in such a way that the stron-
ger the intention, the higher the probability of observing
the corresponding actual behavior. Nevertheless, when
helping behavior has been assessed simply through the
willingness of the participants to make a donation to
an annual charity or by asking participants if they are
willing to take part in a second experiment, participants
may simply comply with experimenters’ requests with-
out truly intending to donate or participate in another
experiment.
In an attempt to go beyond mere declared intention,
we employ a measure of commitment to help as a depen-
dent variable. Imagine, for example, measuring whether
participants are willing to donate money to charity.
Participants are told to imagine a fund-raising event
for charity and to indicate in a questionnaire how much
they eventually want to give. This should be a measure
of intention to donate. But imagine instead that parti-
cipants are told not only to mark their willingness to
donate but also to send to the research staff an e-mail
with their personal information so that they could be
contacted to make that donation. In this second case,
the participants’ overt behavior attests to their intention
to help. We assume that in this case, what we are mea-
suring is commitment to donate. Commitment has been
described as the pledging or binding of the individual to
behavioral acts (Ciofﬁ & Garner, 1996; Kiesler &
Sakumura, 1966). In the current example, participants
not only express an intention to give a certain sum to
charity but also really do something (send an e-mail with
personal information) that should signify to others that
they are more intent on engaging in related behavior
(Cialdini, 2001).
It seems established that commitment generally has a
strong link with behavior (Lokhorst, Werner, Staast, van
Dijk, & Gale, 2013; Katzev & Wang, 1994) and that the
effect of commitment may last for an extended period
(Ciofﬁ & Garner, 1996; Nelson & Norton, 2005).
Regarding prosociality, Nelson and Norton (2005)
found that priming participants with the concept of
1Garcia et al.’s (2002) measure of helping behavior was the willing-
ness to contribute an annual donation (Studies 1 and 2) and to agree to
participate in a second experiment (Study 3). Nelson and Norton
(2005) operationalized helping by asking participants to evaluate their
behaviors in some hypothetical situations (Studies 1a and 1b) and by
asking them to participate in a second experiment (Study 2). Pichon
et al. (2007) tested the impact of subliminal priming of religious con-
cepts essentially on prosocial behavioral intentions; their measure
was ‘‘how many pamphlets participants had taken in order to distrib-
ute them’’ but the authors did not actually measure if participants
really would have distributed all the pamphlets. One of the exceptions
is the research by Macrae and Johnston (1998) that used a measure of
real helping behavior, recording how many leaking pens participants
picked up.
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‘‘superhero’’ resulted in an increased commitment to vol-
unteer, and this improved commitment lasted for weeks.
The general idea is that when people commit to a certain
behavior, they adhere to their commitment and this pro-
duces long-term behavior change. Furthermore, as
shown by the literature on commitment, some speciﬁc
conditions are particularly effective in triggering com-
pliance (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). In particular, it
has been demonstrated how taking a decision in an active
rather than passive way (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Ciofﬁ &
Garner, 1996), or publicly rather than privately (Kiesler,
1971; Nyer & Dellande, 2010) increases the likelihood of
future compliance.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES
Study 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that priming
a scenario where many people are present (in addition to
the participant in the experiment) diminishes the com-
mitment to help compared to priming a scenario where
only one other person is present (in addition to the par-
ticipant in the experiment). In Study 1a, visual stimuli
(pictures) were used; Study 1b was conducted using as
primes auditory stimuli (listening to a group discussion
vs. listening to a monologue) as in some classical
bystander effect research (e.g., Darley & Latane´, 1968)
in which participants were sitting in a cabin with a
microphone and a loudspeaker and heard a varied num-
ber of people making their presence manifest through
their voices. In both experiments, besides commitment,
a measure of intention to help was assessed as dependent
variable. Study 2 was conducted to generalize the
implicit bystander effect to real helping behavior. Again,
the central hypothesis was that participants primed with
the presence of others would offer less helping behavior.
In line with the majority of studies on classic
bystander effect, in which this phenomenon was mainly
analyzed in nondangerous and nonviolent emergencies
(see Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek, & Frey, 2006;
Fischer et al., 2011),2 in the studies reported next our
focus is on the occurrence of the implicit bystander
effect in situations that do not represent a dangerous
situation and wherein the sufferers’ needs do not result
from risky situations.
STUDY 1A
Similar to Garcia, Weaver, Darley, and Spence’s (2009)
procedure, participants were asked to imagine them-
selves either in a crowded movie theatre (group con-
dition) or in an empty movie theatre with just one
friend (one-person control condition). In the neutral con-
trol condition, participants were not primed. The
hypothesis is that participants primed with the crowded
cinema scenario (being in a group condition) would show
less intention to help and should be less committed to
help, compared both to the participants primed with
the empty cinema and to participants not primed (the
two control conditions).
Method
Participants. A total of 881 (455 women, 426 men;
M age¼ 24 years) undergraduate students participated
in a between-participants online experiment. Parti-
cipants were recruited by an advertisement posted by
faculty members on social networks and were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions: the being in a group
condition, the one-person control condition, and a neutral
control condition.
Materials and procedure. The experimental pro-
cedure consisted of two parts. First, participants were
informed that they would participate in a ‘‘visual atten-
tion and memory experiment.’’ They were instructed to
pay attention to a video presentation and to answer a
few questions about it afterward. After the instruction,
participants were then exposed to a video presentation
describing an ordinary situation of being in a movie
theatre when a movie was about to start. The video pres-
entation consisted of 10 pictures that automatically fol-
lowed one after the other in a ﬁxed order. Two different
versions of the presentation were created: the ﬁrst one
was designed to prime the construct of being in a group;
the latter was designed to prime the construct of being
with just another person.
In the group priming condition, participants were
asked to imagine themselves inside a crowded movie
theatre while some pictures illustrated this situation. In
the one-person control condition, participants were
asked to imagine themselves inside an empty theater
with just one friend. Thus some pictures depicted rows
of empty seats with just two persons sitting next to
one another. After the manipulation, participants com-
pleted what they believed to be the response form, which
2Fischer et al. (2006) pointed out that only a small amount of
research on the bystander effect has confronted subjects with an
emergency caused by a violent crime with potentially unsafe conse-
quences for the bystander and the victim. In most cases, the problem
of the victim was generally viewed as an impersonally caused accident
(e.g., falling bookcases, Latane´ & Rodin, 1969; theft of books, Howard
& Crano, 1974), as a physical illness (e.g., nervous seizures, Darley &
Latane´, 1968), or in the virtual world (Blair, Foster Thompson, &
Wuensch, 2005). Further, Fischer et al.’s (2011) meta-analytic review
on bystander intervention in dangerous emergencies revealed that the
effect is moderate when the emergency is a dangerous one.
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contained a few ﬁller questions about the video
presentation.
Analogous to the procedures used in other research,
after the priming phase, participants completed the
purportedly unrelated dependent measure (Dijksterhuis
& Bargh 2001; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1998). Participants in the neutral control condition went
directly to this second phase in which all participants
read the following prompt on the computer monitor:
A student needs help because he has to urgently ﬁnd
people who are willing to participate in another experi-
ment in the laboratory. Are you available to go to the
experimental laboratory in a couple of days? Using the
mouse, please click the initial letter (Y vs. N) that corre-
sponds with your intention.
Thus, behavioral intentions were recorded. In the
event that the participant manifested an afﬁrmative
intention to take part in the experiment, the commit-
ment variable was recorded through an additional
screenshot in which participants read the following:
Now, you should send an e-mail from your own account
to the address that appears on the screen with all your
personal information and your phone number so we
can arrange an appointment. Tomorrow, you will be
contacted by the research team in order to schedule a
date and time for the experiment.
Because the experimental procedure required that
subjects were alone in front of their own computers, it
was possible for the participants (who initially answered
‘‘yes’’) to refrain from sending their e-mails, personal
details, and phone numbers at the end of the experi-
mental session. After completing the dependent mea-
sure, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Globally, the intention to help exceeded the commit-
ment to help (22% vs. 15%). Almost 32% of participants
who reported readiness to take part in a second experi-
ment hesitated when asked to commit by sending an
e-mail containing their phone numbers and contact
information.
According to the main hypothesis of this study, part-
icipants primed with the construct of being in a group
(group condition) would show less commitment to help,
thus sending fewer agreement e-mails to the research
team, compared with participants in both control con-
ditions. Chi-square tests were used to test this predic-
tion. Priming the sensation of being in a group
signiﬁcantly altered the rate of commitment, compared
to both control conditions, v2(1, N¼ 547)¼ 4.22,
p¼ .04 and v2(1, N¼ 662)¼ 11.59, p¼ .001, respectively
for the no-prime and one-person control condition.
Control conditions did not differ statistically from one
another, v2(1, N¼ 553)¼ 1.08, p¼ .29. Table 1 shows
the frequency of commitment in all three conditions.
The frequency of behavioral intentions was submitted
to the same analysis. No signiﬁcant differences emerged
from the analyses of intentions. Helping intentions fol-
lowing the priming of a crowded movie theater
(20.7%) did not differ from helping intentions after
priming a scenario with only one person (22.8%), v2(1,
N¼ 662)¼ .39, p¼ .52, or from helping intentions
assessed without any prime (23.3%), v2(1,
N¼ 547)¼ .51, p¼ .47.
Given that commitment was required only for those
respondents who manifested the intention to help, it is
interesting to look at the proportion of commitment
among those participants. In the one-person control
condition, 85.5% of the participants who intended to
help effectively provided their contact information so
that they could be recruited in a subsequent study,
whereas in the group condition, this percentage dropped
to 48.5%, v2(1, N¼ 144)¼ 22.59, p< .001.
STUDY 1B
The aim of Study 1b was to replicate the effect of the
presence of an implicit bystander, showing that the sen-
sation of being in group can also be activated by audi-
tory stimuli. Auditory priming is ecologically valid and
not just a manipulation designed for laboratory
research. It is also the case that in real life, visual infor-
mation will not always complement auditory infor-
mation. Again, we hypothesized that participants
primed with the construct of a group (group condition)
would show less intention to help and would be less
committed to taking part in a subsequent experiment,
compared to participants in control conditions who
were primed with the construct of being with just
another person (one-person control condition).
TABLE 1
Frequency and Percentage of Commitment in All
Three Conditions (Study 1a)
Commitment
Conditions Yes No Total
Prime group N 33 295 328
% 10.1% 89.9% 100%
Prime one person N 65 269 334
% 19.5% 80.5% 100%
No prime N 35 184 219
% 16% 84% 100%
Total N 133 748 881
% 15.1% 84.9% 100%
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Method
Participants. A total of 109 (50 women, 59 men; M
age¼ 25 years) undergraduate students recruited by
an advertisement posted on faculty members’ social
networks took part in a between-subjects online
experiment.
Materials and procedure. The experimental pro-
cedure was analogous to that of Study 1a, except that
audio tracks were used to prime the concept of being
in a group or to prime the construct of being with just
another person. Thus, participants were informed that
they would participate in an ‘‘auditory attention and
memory test’’ and were asked to listen carefully to the
speech to be able to answer a few questions afterward.
Following the instructions, participants were exposed
to the priming audio track. Two versions of the track
were created—one for each condition—with the purpose
of priming the constructs of being in a group or being
with just another person. Because the two control con-
ditions did not differ in Study 1a, the neutral control
condition was not used. On all of the tracks, subjects lis-
tened to the same advice about ‘‘things to consider
before purchasing a telescope.’’ The implicit presence
of a group versus one person was manipulated by chan-
ging the number of people who were talking about tele-
scopes. More speciﬁcally, in the group condition,
participants were exposed to a conversation among six
people, while in the one-person condition, all of the
advice was read by the same voice. The audio track
lasted for 80 s. Afterward, a link to a response form
appeared, containing a few ﬁller questions about things
to consider before purchasing a telescope.
Once participants completed the response form, the
dependent measures (intention and commitment) were
assessed in a way completely identical to Study 1a.
Results
Globally, the intention to help exceeded the commit-
ment to help (31.2% vs. 11%). A consistent percentage
of participants (64.7%) declared that they were ready
to take part in a second experiment in a few days. But
when asked to commit by sending an e-mail containing
their phone numbers and contact information, they
usually hesitated.
As reported in Table 2, participants who listened to
the monologue prime (one-person condition) were more
committed (17.6%) to help than those who listened to
the group discussion (group condition; 5.2%), v2(1,
N¼ 109)¼ 4.31, p¼ .038. No signiﬁcant differences
emerged from the analyses of intentions. In fact, helping
intentions in the one-person condition (27.5%) did not
differ from helping intentions in the group condition
(34.5%), v2(1, N¼ 109)¼ .62, p¼ .42.
As the data show, the percentage of committed part-
icipants decreased from almost 18% in the one-person
condition to 5.2% in the group conversation condition.
Looking at the frequency of the intention to help, it
can be seen that the percentage of subjects who
expressed a positive intention varied from 34% in the
being-in-a-group condition to almost 28% in the
one-person condition. Because commitment was
required only for those participants who gave their
intention to help, we again looked at the proportion of
commitment among those who intended to help. In
the one-person control condition, 64.3% of the parti-
cipants who intended to help effectively provided their
contact information so they could be recruited in a
subsequent study; this percentage dropped to 15% in
the group condition, v2(1, N¼ 34)¼ 8.75, p¼ .003.
Discussion
These analyses revealed that participants who were
primed with the construct of a group showed less inten-
tion to help and were less committed to taking part in a
subsequent experiment, consistent with the implicit
bystander effect. Further, the ﬁndings suggest that the
intention to help is not always followed by a commit-
ment to help. The rationale is that commitment requires
participants to engage, write an e-mail, and send per-
sonal information, whereas manifesting the intention
to help requires only ﬂagging a checkbox. Moreover,
after checking the box, participants may change their
minds without consequences, but changing their minds
after having sent their personal information—that is,
after having committed—may cause moral self-criticism
and reprehension. It was assumed that, for these rea-
sons, not all of the participants who declared their inten-
tion to help were committed to the task.
Although the literature has shown that asking
people’s stated intention to do something increases their
TABLE 2
Frequency and Percentage of Commitment in the Two Different
Conditions (Study 1b)
Commitment
Condition Yes No Total
Prime group N 3 55 58
% 5.2% 94.8% 100%
Prime one person N 9 42 51
% 17.6% 82.4% 100%
Total N 12 97 109
% 11% 89% 100%
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probability of doing it (e.g., Sherman, 1980), this may be
less true for private and low-effort intention expressions
consisting of, for example, simply ﬂagging a checkbox in
an online form. In such cases, it seems plausible to argue
that social desirability plays an important role, pushing
respondents to agree to take part in a future experiment.
Things are different if they have to take an active part
and do something more binding—in this case, sending
an e-mail—to let the experimenter know that they would
be available for a future psychological experiment.
Commitment may be less sensitive to the effect of social
desirability, and for this reason, it is likely to result in
more consistent behavior compared to the mere mani-
festation of intentions.
Understanding how best to obtain a commitment so
that diffusion of responsibility will not occur could be
of great value. Ciofﬁ and Garner (1996) demonstrated
that making a volunteer decision by doing something
results in more commitment than making the identical
decision by doing nothing. Similarly, Pardini and
Katzev (1983) found that commitment can be increased
by seeking a written pledge. More recently, He, Chen,
and Alden (2012) found that people allocated more
resources to ‘‘help-others’’ (vs. ‘‘help-self’’) health activi-
ties when their decisions were public than when their
decisions were private. Specularly, our point of view is
that the reduced personal involvement triggered by the
group prime can be compared to the situation in which
a person commits in a passive way verbally or privately
and, consequently, can lead to greater diffusion of
responsibility on a subsequent task.
STUDY 2
Although Studies 1a and 1b showed the implicit
bystander effect on commitment to help, it is important
to demonstrate that it appears also when real helping
behavior is assessed. Again, results from the group con-
dition were compared with results from a control con-
dition in which participant imagined themselves in a
hypothetical situation with another person.
Method
Participants. A total of 109 undergraduate students
(57 women, 52 men; M age¼ 24 years) who were not
enrolled in psychology courses took part in Study 2.
They were randomly assigned to one of the two priming
conditions (prime: group vs. one-person).
Material and procedure. Participants were run
individually and did not meet until the end of the data
collection period. The experimenter welcomed each par-
ticipant and explained that he or she would take a visual
attention test. The priming procedure was analogous to
that of Study 1a. Again, in the being in a group priming
condition, participants were asked to imagine them-
selves inside a crowded movie theatre while some pic-
tures illustrated this situation. In the one-person
control condition, participants were asked to imagine
themselves inside an empty theater with just one friend
while some pictures depicted rows of empty seats with
just two persons sitting next to one another. Also in this
case, after the priming manipulation, participants
completed what they believed to be the response form,
which contained a few ﬁller questions about the video
presentation.
Once the ﬁrst phase was completed, a second phase
began including the measure of the dependent
variable—that is, helping behavior. The participant,
once he or she completed the alleged ‘‘visual attention
and memory test,’’ came out of the lab and crossed
paths with a student (actually, a confederate) who came
from another lab door and made the request for help.
Speciﬁcally, the confederate explained that he had to
complete data coding questionnaires into a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet ﬁle by the afternoon because his thesis
tutor (at this point the confederate named a professor in
the department of psychology) wanted the ﬁle submitted
later that day. Participants were told that it was the last
day to present the experiment data ﬁle to the secretary’s
ofﬁce; the submission served as a sort of registration for
the thesis of the following month (usually the manu-
script itself can be presented later). The problem was
that he had seen, from the window of the lab, a tow
truck taking his car away. Before 6 p.m., he had to
retrieve the car from the parking lot where towed
vehicles were taken. This was the basis for the help
request. The confederate then asked the subject if he
or she would insert data into an Excel spreadsheet while
he (the confederate) went to retrieve his car. If parti-
cipants agreed, they entered the lab and received the
data-coding instruction. Participants were also told that
they could leave whenever they wanted to do so.
Behavioral measure. As a measure of dependent
variables, we considered a dichotomous variable
(whether or not participants were ready to help) and
the number of questionnaires coded in the data ﬁle.
Participants were allowed to enter all the questionnaires
they wanted without any time limit.3
Results and Discussion
We analyzed the frequency of participants giving help as
a function of priming condition. Considerably fewer
3No case limit occurred; that is, noparticipants entered an
exceptionally large number of questionnaires.
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participants in the group priming condition (51.9% of
the 54 participants) agreed to help the confederate in
coding questionnaire data compared to the one-person
priming condition (70.9% of the 55 participants), v2(1,
N¼ 109)¼ 4.17, p¼ .04.
As previouslymentioned, we also recorded the number
of questionnaires coded in the data ﬁle in the two different
experimental conditions. In this analysis, participants
who did not give any helpwere counted as ‘‘zero question-
naires inserted’’ instead of eliminating them from the
analysis. A one-way analysis of variance showed that
participants exposed to the group priming condition
(M¼ 7.46, SD¼ 8.61) inserted signiﬁcantly fewer ques-
tionnaires than subjects in one-person priming condition
(M¼ 12.35, SD¼ 10.73), F(1, 108)¼ 6.84, p¼ .01.
The aim of this study was to demonstrate that
implicit bystander effect may inﬂuence real helping
behavior. The results support this hypothesis. Parti-
cipants who imagined a group of people at Time 1
offered less assistance at Time 2 than the control parti-
cipants who imagined one other person. It is interesting
to note that the imagined situation is signiﬁcantly differ-
ent and completely independent from the context in
which the request for help came. Nevertheless, having
a group of people in mind seems enough to trigger
bystander apathy in a completely unrelated situation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research adds to the existing literature by
replicating and extending the effect documented by
Garcia and coworkers (Garcia et al., 2009; Garcia
et al., 2002) whose main point was that bystanders do
not necessarily have to be physically present but that
the psychological salience of any number of others can
be a sufﬁcient condition to produce bystander-effect-like
results. As noted previously, most of the research on
automaticity in the prosocial behavior area tested the
impact of priming on helping intentions. In placing
our emphasis on commitment to help (Studies 1a and
1b) and on real helping behaviors (Study 2), our ﬁndings
signiﬁcantly extend past research showing that the
activation of the construct of being in a group inhibits
prosocial responses on a subsequent task.
It is true that the boundary between intention and
commitment is not always sharp, yet it is possible to
express an intention with a minimum of commitment
or with greater commitment.4 Likely, the strength of
the commitment varies also according to the way in
which the intention is assessed. Further, there are cases
in which adhering to the experimenter’s requests is quite
easy. But when people are asked to do something that
would make explicit and visible their intentions, the ease
of following through on simple intentions should be
attenuated, as people are not always able or willing to
commit so strongly. In fact, it is noteworthy that Study
1 revealed only small and statistically non signiﬁcant
priming effects on helping intentions, unlike the ﬁndings
of Garcia and colleagues (Garcia et al., 2009; Garcia
et al., 2002) ﬁndings. Given the wide use of behavioral
intention in the domain of helping behavior, it may be
surprising that no implicit bystander effect on this vari-
able emerged in Study 1. As we discussed earlier, how-
ever, social desirability can be a plausible explanation
considering the experimental procedure adopted. Com-
mitment to a behavior is probably less likely as a result
of mere compliance with the experimenter’s request; is a
more robust measure; and, for this reason, is likely to
result in more consistent behavior compared to the mere
statement of intentions.
We think an effort should be made to increase the
external validity of experiments on the implicit
bystander effect by assessing real-life, prosocial beha-
vior. Although commitment to help is closer to helping
behavior than behavioral intentions are, it is still not a
real behavioral measure. This is the rationale that led
us to Study 2. Generally speaking, a wider use of beha-
vioral measures of prosocial behavior would undoubt-
edly make the operation of data collection more
complicated (Scafﬁdi Abbate, Isgro`, Wicklund, & Boca,
2006). Nevertheless, this is a necessary option for attain-
ing a better understanding of helping.
The precise processes mediating the implicit
bystander effect are still under investigation. Past
research has shown (Garcia et al., 2002, Studies 4 and
5) that simply imagining a group can lead to facilitated
responses to words associated with unaccountable in a
lexical decision task. Thus, increased accessibility of
the concept unaccountable may be the mechanism by
which priming the presence of others leads to less help-
ing on a subsequent task. In other words, people who
imagine group situations have the concept of unac-
countability triggered, and this leads them to identify
the event as one that does not need help. However, the
effect of imagining people who are not physically
present is not peculiar to helping behavior. For example,
Turner, Crisp, and Lambert (2007) found that simply
imagining contact with out-group members can improve
intergroup attitudes. It is also true that the mechanism
through which group primes exert an inﬂuence could
be more direct and unmediated. Literature on the auto-
maticity of social behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows,
1996; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998) indicates
4For example, Pardini and Katzev (1983) found that strong com-
mitments, where subjects signed a statement saying their household
would participate in a project on newspaper recycling, appeared to
be more effective than minimal commitments, where subjects were
asked to make a verbal commitment to recycle. The results indicated
that the stronger the commitment, the greater the degree of recycling.
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that, in some circumstances, priming a concept
automatically activates related behavioral schemas. As
such, it is also be possible that priming groups directly
trigger behavioral manifestations of unaccountability,
which in turn interfere with a helping response.
Last, the obtained results provide evidence for the
consistency and replicability of priming effects.
Recognition of the importance of direct replication seems
tobe rapidly growing.Behavioral priminghas always been
a controversial topic in social cognition. How the
activation of social constructs via priming can affect beha-
vior, howreliable these effects are, andhowstrongof a role
they may play in real-life situations are all questions that
have recently been debated in the literature (Bargh,
2012; Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012; Doyen,
Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Harris, Coburn,
Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013). For example, Doyen et al.
(2012) showed that even some of the most cited
experimental results—like those of Bargh et al. (1996), in
which participants unwittingly exposed to the stereotype
of old age walked slower when exiting the laboratory—
may be affected by apparently unrelated variables like
the experimenters’ expectations. Thus, although auto-
matic behavioral priming seems well established in the
social cognition literature, additional research on the
reproducibility of priming effects is clearly in order.
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